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I. INTRODUCTION

The most important social problem facing humanity at the beginning
of the 21st century is the yawning divide in standards of living between
the rich nations of the global North and the poor nations of the global
South. The following table gives some indicia of the current gap in living
standards. It shows that the majority of the population in most developing countries lives on less than two dollars a day; that in some
developing countries, over a quarter of children aged 10-14 are employed in the work force; that mortality for children under five in
developing countries can be ten to fifteen times as high as in developed
countries; that over half the population in many developing countries
lacks access to safe drinking water or sanitation; and that illiteracy rates
among 15-24 year olds can be as high as 40% for males and 60% for
females.
The persistence of such gaps is unacceptable. The North-South divide lies at the heart of the rich world's current troubles, including
terrorism, immigration pressures, and environmental threats (such as
global warming or threats to biodiversity). None of these issues can be
adequately addressed without taking measures to bridge the divide, and
to bring the South up to a level where it can cooperate with the North.
An agenda to begin bridging the divide already exists. All 191 members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to achieve eight
goals (the "Millennium Development Goals," or MDGs) by 2015:
1. Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a
dollar a day, and who suffer from hunger;

*
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2. Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary education;
3. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education;
4. Reduce by 2/3 the mortality rate of children under five;
5. Reduce maternal mortality rates by 3/4;
6. Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV, malaria, and
other major diseases;
7.

Reduce by half the proportion of people without access to
safe drinking water, and ensure environmental sustainability;
and

8. Develop a global partnership for development.'
The UN has estimated that achieving the MDGs would require an
additional $50 billion per year in aid to developing countries from now
until 2015.2 Unfortunately, current projections show that this relatively
small sum (less than 2% of the U.S. Federal budget) cannot be obtained,
and achievement of the MDGs by 2015 is uncertain.3
The key problem is the reluctance of people in rich democracies to
support foreign aid. Most rich countries provide less than 1% of their total
budget to aid poor countries, and many (including the United States) provide much less. Moreover, even this meager aid is highly unpopular: most
opinion surveys in the United States show that Americans both overestimate by a factor of over a hundred how much aid is given, and would
favor eliminating all foreign aid. In addition, most of the aid that is given
is governed by political considerations, rather than by where it would produce the best results (for example, a very high percentage of total U.S. aid
is given to Israel and Egypt under the 1977 Camp David accords).
It is possible to argue that given the link between the North-South
divide and problems facing the North, such as terrorism and immigration
pressures, it is shortsighted for the people of the North to oppose foreign
aid. There are, however, four arguments to the contrary. First, even
achieving the MDGs will not bridge the divide; the problems will persist.
To really bridge the divide would require an unacceptable level of
I.
United Nations Millennium Development Goals Website, at http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals.
2.
Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary General, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/59/282 (2004), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/NO4/465/40/PDF/N0446540.pdf. [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
3.

See id.
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redistribution: Joel Slemrod and his colleagues have estimated that to
achieve the same level of redistribution internationally as is currently
achieved by the U.S. tax system domestically, over 60% of the world's
population would be on welfare, and tax rates on the remaining 40%
would more than triple.4 Second, the notion that "the poor of your own
community come first" has a very strong hold, and most people are
likely to continue supporting local causes before they support aid to foreigners. Third, there is the concern that foreign aid is simply wasted, or
worse, lines the pockets of corrupt foreign officials. In the absence of
adequate international supervision of aid distribution, this is a difficult
argument to counter. Finally, even if people are misguided in their opposition to foreign aid, in a democracy the people govern, and their wishes,
rather than the wishes of the elite, should dictate the use of tax money.
Thus, an increase in official aid to the level required by the MDGs is
not in the cards. For the same reason, proposals to levy some kind of tax
on the North in order to fund development in the South, like the Tobin
Tax on currency exchanges, or a tax on computer bits, seem unlikely to
be implemented, since voters in the North would not approve of them,
for the same reasons they disapprove of foreign aid.
Can anything be done, then, to help the South achieve the MDGs? It
seems to me that the key is to help the developing countries help themselves, and the key to that is to identify issues in which opposition
between the North and the South stems more from the influence of "special interests" in the North than from opposition by the people of the
North as a whole. That is, the key is to identify issues on which the prodevelopment position would prevail if brought to a democratic vote in
the North. One good example of such an issue seems to be trade in agricultural goods and textiles, in which the majority in rich countries would
benefit if tariff barriers and subsidies were reduced. This issue is addressed elsewhere in this volume, so I will not further belabor it here.
Another, similar issue is tax competition among developing countries, which costs them significant tax revenues, and benefits richcountry interests like multinational enterprises and the financial services
sector. To understand this issue requires an overview of current developments in international taxation, as they relate to globalization.
In general, the current age of globalization can be distinguished from
the previous one (from 1870 to 1914) by the much higher mobility of
capital than of labor (in the previous age, before immigration restrictions, labor was at least as mobile as capital). This increased mobility
has been the result of technological changes (the ability to move funds
4.
Wojciech Kopczuk et al., The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution:
An Optimal TaxationApproach, EUR. ECON. REv. (forthcoming).
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electronically), and the relaxation of exchange controls. The mobility of
capital has led to tax competition, in which sovereign countries lower
their tax rates on income earned by foreigners within their borders in
order to attract both portfolio and direct investment. Tax competition, in
turn, threatens to undermine the individual and corporate income taxes,
which remain major sources of revenue (in terms of percentage of total
revenue collected) for all modern states.
The response of both developed and developing countries to these
developments has been first, to shift the tax burden from (mobile) capital
to (less mobile) labor, and second, when further increased taxation of
labor becomes politically and economically difficult, to cut government
services. Thus, globalization and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis
for countries that wish to continue to provide services to their citizens, at
the same time as demographic factors and the increased income inequality, job insecurity, and income volatility that result from globalization
render such services more necessary.
This paper argues that if government service programs are to be
maintained in the face of globalization, and if developing countries are to
raise the funds needed to achieve the MDGs, it is necessary to cut the
intermediate link by limiting tax competition. From both practical and
normative considerations, however, any limits placed on tax competition
should be congruent with maintaining the ability of democratic states to
determine the size of their governments.
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND
THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL

From its beginnings late in the 19th century, the modern state has
been financed primarily by progressive income taxation. The income tax
differs from other forms of taxation (such as consumption or social security taxes) in that in theory it includes income from capital in the tax
base, even if it is saved and not consumed. Because the rich save more
than the poor, a tax that includes income from capital in its base is more
progressive (taxes the rich more heavily) than a tax that excludes income
from capital (e.g., a consumption tax or a payroll tax). The ability to tax
saved income from capital (i.e., income not vulnerable to consumption
taxes) is impaired, however, if the capital can be shifted overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes taxation.
Two recent developments have dramatically augmented the ability of
both individuals and corporations to earn income overseas free of income taxation: the effective end of withholding taxation by developed
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countries, and the rise of production tax havens in developing countries
Since the United States abolished its withholding tax on interest paid to
foreigners in 1984, no major capital-importing country has been able to
impose such a tax, for fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital for domestic borrowers, including the
government itself).6 The result is that individuals can generally earn investment income free of host-country taxation in any of the world's
major economies. Moreover, even developed countries find it exceedingly difficult to effectively collect the tax on the foreign income of their
individual residents in the absence of withholding taxes imposed by host
countries, because the investments can be made through tax havens with
strong bank secrecy laws.8 Developing countries, with much weaker tax
administrations, find this task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border investment income can largely be earned free of either host or home
country taxation.'
For example, consider a wealthy Mexican who wishes to earn taxfree interest income from investing in the bonds of an American corporation. All he needs to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a Cayman Islands
corporation to hold the bonds. The interest payments are then made to
the Caymans corporation without any U.S. tax withheld, under the socalled "portfolio interest exemption."' The individual does not report the
income to the Mexican tax authorities, and they have no way of knowing
that the Caymans corporation is effectively an "incorporated pocketbook" of the Mexican resident. Nor are the exchange of information
provisions of the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of any help, because the IRS
has no way of knowing that the recipient of the interest payments is controlled by a Mexican resident, and therefore cannot report this to the
Mexican authorities. As a result, the income is earned completely free of
tax (the Caymans, of course, impose no income taxes of their own).
5.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000).
6.
See generally VITo TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD (1995); Edward
H. Gardner, Taxes on Capital Income in TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 52 (George Kopits ed., 1992).
7.
See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Linda Swartz, Virtual Taxation: Source-Based Taxation in
the Age of Derivatives, 2 DERIVATIVES 247 (1997); Edmund S. Cohen, Individual International Tax Planning Employing Equity Derivatives, 4 DERIVATIVES 52 (1996) (foreign
residents may avoid host-country withholding tax through equity derivatives); Gregory May,
Flying on Instruments: Synthetic Investments and Withholding Tax Avoidance, 73 TAX NOTES
1225 (1996).
8.
TANZI, supra note 6.
9.
Chander Kant, Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Flight, 80 PRINCETON STUD.
INT'L FIN. 1 (1989); Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight from Latin
America, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 321 (1989).
10.
I.R.C. § 871(h).
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When we switch our attention from passive to productive investment, a similar threat to the taxing capacity of both home and host
jurisdictions emerges. In the last decade, competition for inbound investment has led an increasing number of countries (103, as of 1998) to
offer tax holidays specifically geared to foreign corporate investors."
Given the relative ease with which an integrated multinational can shift
production facilities in response to tax rates, such "production tax havens" enable multinationals to derive most of their income abroad, free
of host-country taxation.' 2 Moreover, most developed countries (including the United States) do not dare impose current taxation (or sometimes
any taxation) on the foreign source business income of their resident
multinationals, for fear of reducing the competitiveness of those multinationals against multinationals of other countries." If they did, new
multinationals could be set up as residents of jurisdictions that do not tax
such foreign source income. 4 Thus, business income can also be earned
abroad, largely free of either host- or home-country taxation.
For example, Intel Corporation, a top ten multinational, has operations in more than thirty countries around the globe. Specifically, outside
the U.S., Intel has major manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico, China,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel. 5 Outside the United
States, all of Intel's manufacturing facilities are located in countries
granting tax holidays. Nor does Intel pay current U.S. tax on its income
from those foreign operations, because under U.S. law, active income
earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is not taxed until it
is repatriated in the form of dividends, which Intel can delay for many
years. 6 Thus, the effective tax rate on Intel's foreign source income is far
below the nominal U.S. corporate rate of 35%.
If income from capital can escape the income tax net, the tax becomes, in effect, a tax on labor. Several empirical studies have in fact
suggested that in some developed jurisdictions, the effective tax rate on
income from capital approaches zero, and tax rates on capital have
11.

RAYMOND VERNON,

IN THE HURRICANE'S

EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF

REPORT 1996:
(1996).
12.
Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income
Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 77 (Alberto Giovannini ed., 1993); James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal
Paradise:Foreign Tax Havens andAmerican Business, 109 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 149 (1994).
13.
Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to ProgressiveReform of U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975 (1997).
James R. Hines, Jr., The Flight Paths of Migratory Corporations,6 J. ACCT. AUDIT14.
MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES

(1998);

UNCTAD,

WORLD

INVESTMENT

INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS

ING & FIN. 447 (1991).

See INTEL CORP., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT (2000).
15.
16.
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997).
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tended to go down sharply since the early 1980s (when exchange controls were relaxed).' 7 As a result, countries that used to rely on the
revenues from the income tax are forced to increase relatively regressive
taxes. The two fastest-growing taxes in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries in recent
years have been consumption taxes (from 12% of total revenues in 1965
to 18% in 1995) and payroll taxes (from 19% to 27%), both of which are
more regressive than the income tax.' 8 Over the same period, the personal and corporate income taxes have not grown as a percentage of total
revenues (the personal income tax accounted for 26% of total revenues
in 1965 and 27% in 1995, while the figures for the corporate income tax
are 9% and 8%, respectively).' 9 Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
in developed countries went up sharply during the same period (from an
average of 28% in 1965 to almost 40% in 1994), and this increase is
largely accounted for by the rise of consumption and payroll taxes.20
Moreover, there is evidence that, as the degree of openness of an economy in OECD member countries increases, taxes on capital tend to go
down, while taxes on labor go up (the income tax is imposed on both
capital and labor, so that its stability may mask this trend).2'
The same trends can be observed in developing countries as well. In
non-OECD member countries (outside the Middle East), total government revenues as a share of GDP rose from an average of 18.8% in
1975-80 to 20.1% in 1986-92.22 This growth was financed primarily by
the growth of revenues from the VAT in the same period (from 25.5% of
total revenues to 31.8%). At the same time, revenues from both the individual and the corporate income tax were flat or declined.23

17.
See OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 1965-2002 passim
GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997).
18.
19.
20.

(2003);

DANI RODRIK, HAS

See OECD, supra note 17, Part II.
Id. at 73.

TAX POLICY DIVISION, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMF].

21.
Enrique G. Mendoza et al., Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Cross-Country
Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Income and Consumption, 34 J. MONETARY ECON. 297
(1994); ENRIQUE G. MENDOZA ET AL., ON THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF TAX POLICY IN ALTERING LONG-RUN GROWTH, (Centre of Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 1378,
1996).
22.
See IMF, supra note 20.
23.
See id.
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III.

TAX COMPETITION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The drawbacks of tax competition for developed countries are relatively clear, because such countries have an elaborate social insurance
safety net that requires a high level of government expenditure which is
threatened by tax competition.24 But how does tax competition affect developing countries?
First, it should be pointed out that developing countries need the
revenues at least as much as developed countries do, if not more. A
common misperception is that only OECD member countries are confronted by a fiscal crisis as a result of the increasing numbers of elderly
people in the population. In fact, the increase in dependency ratios (the
ratio of the elderly to the working population) is expected to take place in
other geographic areas as well, as fertility rates go down and health care
improves." Outside the OECD and the transition economies, the dependency ratio starts in the single digits in the 1990s, but rises to just below
30% by 2100.26 Moreover, while outside the OECD and the transition
economies direct spending on social insurance is much lower, other forms
of government spending (e.g., government employment) effectively fulfill
a social insurance role. In Latin America, for example, direct government
spending on social insurance is much lower than indirect spending
through government employment and procurement programs.27
Moreover, it seems strange to argue that developing countries need
tax revenues less than developed countries because they have less developed social insurance programs. If one accepts the normative case for
social insurance, it applies to developing countries with even greater
force because of widespread poverty, which means that losing a job can
have much direr consequences.2 ' The need for revenues in developing
countries, however, goes far beyond social insurance. In some developing countries, revenues are needed to insure the very survival of
organized government, as the Russian experience demonstrates.29 In
other, more stable developing countries, revenues are needed primarily
to provide for adequate education (investment in human capital), which
24.

WILLI LEIBFRITZ ET AL.,

OECD ECON.

DEP'T, AGEING POPULATIONS, PENSION

156, 1995) available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/8/1863020.pdf.
25.
See generally Janet Stotsky, Payroll Taxes and the Funding of Social Security Systems in IMF, supra note 20, at 177.
26.
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Policies for the XXIst Century, 21st IFA CONGRESS
SEMINAR SERIES 9, 11 (1996).
27.
K. SUBBARAO ET AL., WORLD BANK, SAFETY NET PROGRAMS AND POVERTY REDUCTION 93-101 (1997).
28.
See UNDP, 1997 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1997).
29.
Meltdown in Russia, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1998, at 47.
SYSTEMS AND GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, (Working Paper No.
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many regard as the key to promoting development. ° For example, the
UN has estimated that for only an additional $50 billion per year, all
people in the world can obtain basic social services (such as elementary
education)." Given current trends in foreign aid, most of these funds
have to come from developed country governments,32 and they are essential if the MDGs are to be reached by 2015.
Second, the standard advice by economists to small open economies
is that they should refrain from taxing foreign investors, because such
investors cannot be made to bear the burden of any tax imposed by the
capital importing country. 33 Therefore, the tax will necessarily be shifted
to less mobile factors in the host country, such as labor and land, and it is
more efficient to tax those factors directly. While this argument seems
quite valid as applied to portfolio investment, however, it seems less
valid with regard to FDI, for two reasons. First, the standard advice does
not apply if a foreign tax credit is available in the home country of the
investor, which frequently would be the case for FDI.34 Second, the standard advice assumes that the host country is small. An extensive
literature on multinationals suggests, however, that they typically exist in
order to earn economic rents. 3 In that case, the host country is no longer
"small" in the economic sense. That is, there is a reason for the investor
to be there and not elsewhere. Therefore, any tax imposed on such rents
(as long as it is below 100%) will not necessarily drive the investor to
leave, even if it is unable to shift the burden of the tax to labor or landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case of rents that are linked to a
specific location, such as natural resources or a large market.36 But what
if the rent can be earned in a large number of potential locations? In this
case, the host country will not be able to tax the rent if the multinational
can credibly threaten to go elsewhere, although once the investment has
been made, the rent can be taxed. This situation, which is probably the
*

30.

Amartya Sen, Development Thinking at the Beginning of the XXI Century, in EcoIN THE XXI CENTURY 531, 536 (Louis Emmerij ed.,

NOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

1997).
31.
See Secretary General's Report, supra note 2.
32.
Report of the Secretary-Generalto the PreparatoryCommittee for The High-Level
InternationalIntergovernmentalEvent on Financingfor Development, U.N. GAOR Preparator
Comm., 2d Sess. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/12 (2000).
33.
See Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, InternationalTax Competition and Gainsfrom
Tax Harmonization, 37 ECON. LETTERS 69 (1991).
34.
TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

71 (1991).

35.
Jean-Francois Hennart, The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, in THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 81, 81-82 (Pitelis et a. eds., 1991).
36.
See JOHN H. DUNNING, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION (1988).
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most common, 37 would require coordinated action to enable all host
countries to tax the rent earned within their borders. Some possibilities
for such action are described below.
This relates to the final argument, which is that host countries need
to offer tax incentives to be competitive. An extensive literature has
demonstrated that taxes do in fact play a crucial role in determining
investment location decisions, 3 but all of these studies emphasize that
the tax incentives are crucial given the availability of such incentives
elsewhere.39 Thus, it can be argued that given the need for tax revenues,
developing countries would in general prefer to refrain from granting tax
incentives, if only they could be assured that no other developing country would be able to grant such incentives.4°
Thus, restricting the ability of developing countries to compete in
granting tax incentives does not truly restrict their autonomy or counter
their interests. This is the case whenever they grant the incentive only for
fear of competition from other developing countries, and would not have
granted it but for such fear. Whenever competition from other countries
drives the tax incentive, eliminating the competition does not hurt the
developing country, and may aid its revenue raising efforts (assuming it
can attract investment on other grounds, which is typically the case).
Moreover, under the proposals described below, developing countries
remain free to lower their tax rates generally (as opposed to granting
specific tax relief aimed at foreign investors).
Two additional points need to be made, from a developing country
perspective. The first concerns the question of tax incidence. Since the
tax competition that is most relevant to developing countries concerns
the corporate income tax, it is important to attempt to assess the incidence of that tax in evaluating the effects of collecting it on the welfare
of the developing country. Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no
consensus exists on the incidence of the corporate tax. While older studies have tended to conclude that the tax is borne by shareholders or by
all capital providers, more recent studies have suggested that the tax is

See Hennart, supra note 35.
See Eric Bond, Tax Holidays and Industry Behavior, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 88
(1981); Michael J. Boskin & William G. Gale, The Effects on Tax Policy on the International
Location of Investment, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 214 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1999); James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to
InternationalTaxation, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 305, 318-19 (1999).
STEPHEN E. GUISINGER & Assocs., INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE
39.
37.

38.

REQUIREMENTS

(1985).

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
40.
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1645 (2000).
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borne to a significant extent by consumers or labor.4' Another possibility
is that the tax on established corporations was borne by those who were
shareholders at the time the tax was imposed or increased, because
thereafter it is capitalized into the price of the shares.4 1 It is unlikely that

this debate will be decided any time soon (in fact, the incidence may be
shifting over time, especially as globalization may enable corporations to
shift more of the tax burden to labor). From the perspective of a developing country deciding whether to collect taxes from a multinational,
however, three out of the four possible alternatives for incidence (current
shareholders or capital providers, old shareholders, and consumers) are
largely the residents of other jurisdictions, and therefore from a national
welfare perspective, the developing country gains by collecting the tax.
Even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in the developing country, it
can be argued that as a matter of tax administration, it is more efficient
(as well as more politically acceptable) to collect the tax from the multinational than to attempt to collect it from the workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a developing country may want to
collect taxes from multinationals even if in general it believes that the
private sector is more efficient in using the resources than the public sector. That is because, in the case of a foreign multinational, the taxes that
the developing country fails to collect may indeed be used by the private
sector, but in another jurisdiction, and would therefore not benefit the
developing country. One possible solution, which is in fact employed by
developing countries, is to refrain from taxing multinationals while they
re-invest domestically, but to tax them upon remittance of the profits
abroad. Such taxation of dividends and other forms of remittance, however, is subject to the same tax competition problem that we discussed
above. Thus, it would appear that overcoming the tax competition problem is in most cases in the interest of developing countries, and the
question remains how to do so in the face of the collective action problem described above.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT TAX COMPETITION?

The tax competition problem is thus essentially a problem of coordination and trust. Each jurisdiction would prefer to tax investors from
abroad to gain the revenue, but is afraid that by doing so it would drive
the investors to other jurisdictions that do not tax them. If there was a
41.
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (1987); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME
ONCE

42.

(1992).
See PECHMAN, supra note 41.
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way to coordinate actions among the relevant jurisdictions, they all could
gain added revenues without running the risk of losing the investment.
A good illustration of how this dynamic works is the history of German taxation of interest income. In 1988, Germany introduced a 10%
withholding tax on interest paid to bank depositors, but had to abolish it
within a few months because of the magnitude of capital flight to Luxembourg. In 1991, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that
withholding taxes on wages but not on interest violated the constitutional
right to equality. The government thereupon reintroduced the withholding
43
tax on interest, but made in inapplicable to non-residents. Non-residents
may, however, be Germans investing through Luxembourg bank accounts. To cope with this problem, the Germans have led an EU effort to
introduce a 20% withholding tax on all interest payments to EU residents. 4 In 2003 the EU adopted a "savings directive" that would provide
for exchange of information (or in some cases a withholding tax) for
payments to residents of member states, but it does not apply to payments to non-EU residents and it is conditioned on obtaining satisfactory
exchange of information from Switzerland and the United States.
Thus, the key to finding a solution to the tax competition problem is
to attack it on a broad multilateral basis, through an organization such as
the OECD. Under current conditions, the OECD is the natural choice for
leading such coordinated actions against tax competition, for three reasons. First, for individual investors to earn decent returns on their capital
without incurring excessive risks, they need to invest in an OECD member country. Tax havens do not offer adequate investment opportunities,
and developing countries are generally considered too risky for portfolio
investment (other than through mutual funds, which do not offer tax
avoidance opportunities). Thus, if all OECD members enforced taxation
of portfolio investment, it could be subject to tax without requiring cooperation from the tax havens.
Second, about 85% of the world's multinationals are headquartered
in OECD member countries. This is likely to continue to be the case for
a while, because OECD members offer stable corporate and securities
law protection to investors that is lacking in other countries. Thus, if all
OECD members agreed on a coordinated basis to tax their multinationals
currently on their income from abroad, most of the problem of tax competition from direct investment could be solved.

Leif Mutdn, International Experience of How Taxes Influence the Movement of
43.
Private Capital,8 TAx NOTES INT'L 743, 746 (1994).
See generally Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997
44.
Concerning Taxation Policy, 1998 O.J. (C2) 2.
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Third, the OECD has the required expertise (its model tax treaty is
the global standard) and has already started on the path of limiting tax
competition. In 1998, it adopted a report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.45 This report is somewhat limited,
because it only addresses tax competition for financial activities and services (as opposed to, e.g., Intel's manufacturing plants). It also does not
address the taxation of investment income. It does represent, however, an
extremely useful first step, and proof that a consensus can be reached on
the tax competition issue (Switzerland and Luxembourg abstained, but
did not dare veto the adoption of the report by the other twenty-seven
members of the OECD).
The OECD makes a useful distinction between tax competition in
the form of generally applicable lower tax rates, and tax regimes designed to attract foreign investors. This distinction is both normatively
and pragmatically sound: restricting tax competition should not and cannot mean that voters in democratic countries lose their right to determine
the size of the public sector through general tax increases or reductions.
Rather, it means that countries should not provide windfalls for foreign
investors at the expense of the ability of other countries to provide those
public services their residents desire. Such limitations are particularly
appropriate because those foreign investors themselves often reside in
countries providing a high level of services, and yet refuse to pay the tax
price that providing such services entails.
Still, relying on the OECD to restrict tax competition suffers from
three significant drawbacks. First, the OECD only has twenty-nine
members, and it is not clear that it can effectively enforce its anti-tax
competition rules on non-member countries. For example, solutions that
rely on where the parents of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are located assume that no significant growth in MNEs will take place outside
the OECD, and solutions that rely on the OECD as the market assume no
significant markets outside the OECD. Either assumption may become
wrong, and when that happens, solutions that rely on OECD enforcement will lose their effectiveness unless those emerging markets were to
join the OECD. While several developing countries have joined the
OECD recently (e.g., South Korea and Mexico), it is hard to imagine
China or India doing so in the near future.
Second, relying on the OECD to implement solutions to the tax
competition problem, even if those solutions are tailored to benefit developing countries, may not be acceptable to those countries. Even
though the OECD has made a huge effort to include non-OECD members in the tax competition project, it is still identified as the rich countries'
45.

OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
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club. Thus, it is hard to believe that developing countries will be able to
shed their suspicion that the OECD will not act in their interests, even if it
can actually be made to do so. In fact, the effort by the OECD to develop a
multilateral agreement on investments (MAI) foundered precisely because
developing countries and left-leaning non-governmental organizations
coordinated a campaign against it as representing the interests of the rich
countries and "their" MNEs.
Third, the OECD effort is limited, so far, to geographically mobile financial services, and excludes real investments, although these constitute a
significant part of the problem. In addition, even for the areas it does
cover, the OECD has only the power to persuade, not to adjudicate.
From these perspectives, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a
more attractive candidate for "world tax organization." It has a much
broader membership than the OECD, and developing countries are much
better represented (and have real clout, as shown by the recent struggle
over choosing the Director General of WTO). Moreover, as indicated
above, the WTO rules already cover and prohibit most forms of harmful
tax competition identified by the OECD.
There are, however, several serious objections to including tax matters in the jurisdiction of the WTO. First, it has been argued that the
WTO lacks sufficient tax expertise. That problem, however, can be remedied by hiring a sufficient number of tax experts to sit on the WTO's
panels. In fact, as the WTO has expanded its jurisdiction to non-tariff
matters, its staff already includes tax experts who also understand trade
issues.
Robert Green has advanced a more serious objection, arguing that the
costs of imposing the WTO's legalistic dispute-resolution mechanism
outweigh any benefits.46 Green argues that the need for the WTO to
resolve trade disputes legalistically is based on two features that are
typically lacking in the tax context: retaliation and lack of transparency.
Retaliation is a feature of repeated prisoners' dilemma type games and
insures that players have an incentive to cooperate. In an assurance (stag
hunt) game, both players cooperate if they can be assured of the other
player's cooperation. In the first case an organizational setting is needed
to manage retaliatory strategies, while in the second it is needed to
provide the information needed for the assurance to exist.
In the context of tax competition, though, it would seem that both retaliation and lack of information are serious problems. For example, in
the case of portfolio investment, the United States began a race to the
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Gov46.
ernments: A Comparison of the InternationalTax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79,
129-39 (1998).
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bottom by abolishing its withholding tax, and other countries responded
(i.e., retaliated) by abolishing their own taxes. In the current situation, no
country dares re-impose its tax without adequate assurance that other
countries will follow. Similarly, for direct investment, countries have
adopted tax incentives or deferral and exemption rules for their resident
MNEs in response to the actions of other countries, and fear changing
such policies without assurance that others will follow suit. Thus,
whether these developments are characterized as prisoners' dilemma or
assurance games, they seem to present precisely the kind of problem that
only a multilateral organization with rule-making power can effectively
resolve.
Green also raises another objection to giving the WTO authority
over taxes, which in practice is likely to be far more potent: the problem
of sovereignty. 47 Countries are wary of giving up their sovereignty over
tax matters, which lies at the heart of their ability to exercise national
power. This concern is particularly acute in the United States and almost
led to the failure of the entire Uruguay Round, as the United States insisted at the last minute on excluding direct taxes from the purview of
the GATS. Green argues that if the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
were given authority over tax issues, this may lead to widespread noncompliance, especially given the perception that the WTO is nontransparent and lacks democratic legitimacy.
Green may be wrong about this estimate, especially since the analysis above has shown that the WTO already has jurisdiction over most
forms of harmful tax competition, so that no further extension of its
powers is necessary. But even if Green is right and sovereignty poses a
real problem, there may be a solution to this as well. Under the GATT
regime, all decisions had to be reached by consensus, that is with the
agreement of the party whose regime is at stake. Under the WTO rules,
on the other hand, all dispute settlement rulings are binding unless there
is a consensus not to implement them; that is, unless even the complaining party agrees to refrain from action. Perhaps the former rule is more
appropriate for tax matters than the latter, because it gives the loser a
veto if it feels that its sovereignty is truly at stake. Similar rules exist for
tax matters in both the EU and the OECD. But, as the DISC case in the
GAT8 4 and the adoption of the tax competition report by the OECD
47.
Id. at 131-32.
48.
The DISC case was brought by the European Union against the United States under
the old GATT regime, challenging the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) as an
export subsidy. The United States lost and complied by abolishing DISC, even though it could
have vetoed the panel report. But see Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the
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show, a country will typically reserve its veto power for those cases in
which the adverse result is truly perceived as a severe limit on its sovereignty. In other cases, the stigma of disapproval is sufficient to ensure
cooperation.
Thus, in the final analysis, it may be necessary to set up a multilateral organization with different rules than the WTO, but with similarly
broad membership. The UN is the obvious venue for setting up such an
organization, building on the important work of the League of Nations
Fiscal Committee. The Current Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters should be upgraded to provide the
basis for such an organization.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of globalization and tax competition, tax rules can no
longer be set by countries acting unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties.
In a world in which capital can move freely across national borders and
multinationals are free to choose among many investment locations, the
ability of any one country (or any two countries in cooperation) to tax
(or otherwise regulate) such capital is severely limited. Any such unilateral attempt will be undercut by other countries, and will probably not
even be attempted, in the name of preserving national competitiveness.
Thus, a multilateral solution is essential if the fundamental goals of taxation or other regulation are to be preserved. Private market activities that
span the globe can only be regulated or taxed by organizations with a
similar global reach.
This paper has attempted to outline some of the ways in which such
global governance can be achieved in the area of capital income taxation.
Achieving this goal will not be easy, given the expected resistance of
both private actors eager to preserve their freedom from taxation, and of
governments concerned about preserving their sovereign ability to set
their own tax rules. But it is not impossible. Moreover, because preserving the ability of developing nations to tax income from capital is
essential to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, it
must be tried.
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